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STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) 1 
vi 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue 1; Did the Court of Appeals correctly conclude that an assignee is limited 
the assignor's damages when presenting an assigned breach of contract claim and thereby 
correctly resolve the Sunridge entities' breach of contract claims? 
Issue 2: Did the Court of Appeals properly conclude that both of the Sunridge 
entities' tort claims failed as a matter of law and thereby properly affirm the trial court's 
summary judgment rulings? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court 
of appeals, not the decision of the trial court. In doing so, this court adopts the 
same standard of review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are 
reviewed for correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if 
clearly erroneous." Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50, f7, 94 P.3d 915. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Court of Appeals' decision pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2(3)(a). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
None are dispositive of the issues on appeal. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Notwithstanding the arguments to the contrary, this case is a breach of contract 
case between Sunridge Development Corporation (SDC) and RB&G. SDC and RB&G 
entered into a contract in order to have RB&G prepare a Preliminary Geology analysis 
for a proposed development - Sunridge. After RB&G performed on its contract with 
SDC, a new Sunridge entity, Sunridge Enterprises, LLC (SEL) was created in order to 
limit liability. SDC sold the land for the Sunridge development to SEL and purportedly 
assigned all of its right in its contract with RB&G to SEL. After the sale and assignment, 
however, SDC continued to work on the Sunridge project and to be a party to the RB&G 
contract. 
In this action, SDC and SEL each asserted contract and tort claims against RB&G. 
During discovery, RB&G learned that SDC and SEL each claimed separate categories of 
damages. Each Sunridge entity incurred separate and distinct damages, which each 
Sunridge entity then sought in separate causes of action. As the Sunridge entities' brief 
points out, the only category of damages at issue in this appeal is SEL's claim for lost 
revenue from its inability to build and sell fourteen units. 
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FACTS 
SDC contracted with RB&G 
This case is based on the Sunridge entities' development of the Alpine Brook 
Townhome development located in Provo, Utah. (R. at 230). In 1981, Sunridge 
Development Corporation (SDC) purchased an 87-acre parcel of property, 10.2 acres of 
which would later become the Alpine Brook development. (R. at 372). In 1993, SDC 
contracted with RB&G to perform a Preliminary Geology analysis of a proposed 
development known as Sunridge, which would include the Alpine Brook development. 
(R. at 231). On June 23, 1993, RB&G submitted its analysis report to SDC. (R. at 231). 
In 1995, SDC again contracted with RB&G to perform a Preliminary Geology analysis of 
the Alpine Brook development, and in August 1995, RB&G submitted its analysis report 
to SDC. (R. at 231). These two contracts between SDC and RB&G are the only contracts 
at issue in this appeal and were performed between 1993-1995. (R. at 548). 
Sunridge created SEL in 1996 
SDC is a Utah corporation formed in March 1969. (R. at 230). Stephen G. 
Stewart is a principal of SDC. (R. at 233). Sunridge Enterprises, L.L.C. (SEL) was 
created in March 1996 for the purpose of buying the Alpine Brook development. (R. at 
374; 230; 253). Stephen G. Stewart is also a principal of SEL. (R. at 233). SEL was 
intentionally created as a separate entity to limit or allocate the Sunridge entities1 liability 
exposure. (R. at 268). When asked in his deposition why SEL was created as a separate 
3 
entity, Mr. Stewart responded: "Our attorneys told us the liability exposure would be less 
with an LLC." (R. at 268). 
SDC sold the Alpine Brook parcel to SEL in 1996. (R. at 374). Accordingly, 
SEL never entered into a contract with RB&G, as SEL was created after the SDC-RB&G 
contracts were entered into and after RB&G had performed on the contracts. (R. at 548). 
At the time of sale, SDC purportedly assigned and transferred all of its rights and claims 
regarding the various engineering reports, surveys, studies, and zoning approvals, etc., to 
SEL. (R. at 374). Other than Mr. Stewart's affidavit, however, no proof of this assignment 
has ever been entered into the record. Additionally, RB&G completed performance of its 
contracts with SDC prior to any purported assignment of SDCs contract rights to SEL. 
(R. at 550). Thus, at the time of the purported assignment, SEL's only remaining right on 
the RB&G contracts was the right to enforce those contracts in the event of a RB&G 
error or omission in its geologic analysis and to pursue SDC's remedies resulting from 
any such breach. (R. at 550). This was the only right that SDC could have assigned to 
SEL. (R. at 550). The record is devoid of any assignment of claims running from SEL to 
SDC. Finally, although SDC assigned its rights to SEL, SDC continued to function as a 
corporate entity. 
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Procedural Details of Case 
Trial Court 
The Sunridge entities filed suit against RB&G on February 5, 2003, for its alleged 
breach of the SDC/RB&G contracts and/or for RB&G's negligent acts, errors or 
omissions in the performance of the contracts. (R. at 1). In the Amended Complaint, the 
Sunridge entities jointly alleged that RB&G breached its contract(s) with SDC and 
negligently performed its services, thereby damaging the Sunridge entities. (R. at 14). 
/. RB&G's first summary judgment motion. 
RB&G filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Partial Summary Judgment on 
the negligence and breach of contract claims on March 8, 2005. (R. at 225). In this first 
summary judgment motion, RB&G argued both SDC's and SEL's tort claims were 
barred by the economic loss rule. Also, RB&G argued that SEL could not assert its own 
breach of contract claim due to lack of privity. In opposition to RB&G's motion and for 
the first time in the case, the Sunridge entities argued that SDC had assigned its rights 
under the contract to SEL. Also, the Sunridge entities argued that RB&G owed an 
independent legal duty to SEL in order to avoid the economic loss rule. (R. at 362-390). 
On August 2, 2005, the trial court granted RB&G's motion for summary judgment and 
partial summary judgment holding that SDC's and SEL's negligence claims were barred 
by Utah's economic loss rule and that the lack of contractual privity between SEL and 
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RB&G limited SEL's ability to recover damages, as an assignee, to those damages 
suffered by SDC. (R. at 538-42, 548-552). 
it RB&G's second summary judgment motion 
RB&G submitted a second motion for summary judgment on July 25, 2006, with 
respect to SDC's claims. (R. at 575). In this motion, RB&G argued that SDC had failed 
to produce sufficient evidence to prove its damages. Specifically, although SDC 
produced an affidavit summarizing its damages, SDC failed to provide any of the 
underlying documentation to prove its generalized summary. The trial court also granted 
RB&Gfs second summary judgment motion. (R. at 697, 722-27). In short, as a result of 
the trial court's rulings on these two summary judgment motions: (i) SDC's and SEL's 
negligence claims had been dismissed pursuant to the economic loss rule; (ii) SEL's 
breach of contract claim had been dismissed for lack of privity; and (iii) SDC's breach of 
contract claim, whether asserted by SDC or SEL, had been dismissed for failure to prove 
damages. 
The parties then entered into a stipulation to expedite this appeal whereby both 
Sunridge entities agreed not to appeal the trial court's second summary judgment ruling 
on proof of SDC's damages. (R. at 736). The stipulated motion to dismiss with prejudice 
SDC's remaining claims for lack of proof of damages was entered on December 18, 
2006. (R. at 736-37) Accordingly, the second summary judgment motion and SDC's 
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damages are not before this Court on appeal, and this appeal addresses solely the issues 
from the i \,i igust 2, 2005 i i iling on R B&G's first si in in: nai y ji ldgment n 1 ;:>tlc n. 
Court of Appeals 
On appeal from the trial court, the Sunridge entities presented two issues: rt) 
wlii'lhei" SI J in iiilill i n «)\ I• i ml • in mil damages Inn llllic I nl llllii I I uinl il'Iiinmi'lli I 
assigned breach of contract claim; and (2) whether the trial court erred in its conclusion 
that SDC could not recover on its negligence claim, because of the economic loss rule. 
I hese t w o issi les are the same argi in lei its adi anced to this Coi II It :)ii Cer tiorai i 
W Itli it: espect tc • SEI " s assigned bi each of conti act slaim, the Com t c f i Appeals 
properly disposed of this w h e n it addressed the law of assignments. Specifically ihc 
Court of Appeals correctly stated: "Under the law of assignments, ' [assignees] are 
brought/" See Sunridge Development ('nm v Rtt&G, 2007 L i App J v | at <wv Thus, the 
Court of Appeals properly uHnm^d mc tnal cour t ' s grant of summary judgmciu ^ ? Ai 
* • - - - - '
s
 ' -
:
 * * "-'- i " h a n i ** *•• > s : l i ' ' f 
contract claim. 
The second issue related to whether SDC could assert a breach of contract claim 
or a negligence claim. Under the second issue, S D C argued alternatively that either it 
h;nl .1 \ iablc bi'i iK'h nl i i »i in III iii I I I; in in in in IIIIIIJ! Jin oavpliMii In llir IVIHIH HIIIIII lih , inilc 
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allowed it to assert a negligence claim. The Court of Appeals properly disposed of 
SDC's claims on procedural grounds. 
First, the breach of contract claim was barred because SDC had failed to prove 
its damages. The trial court granted RB&G's second motion for summary judgment on 
this issue, and the Sunridge entities agreed to not appeal any issues relating to SDC's 
damages as part of the stipulation resolving the case. 
Second, SDC's alleged damages for breach of contract and negligence were 
identical. SDC did not attempt to differentiate its damages under either theory, rather its 
negligence and breach of contract claims were alternative theories seeking the same 
relief. Accordingly, the second summary judgment motion and the parties' stipulation 
that these issues would not be appealed is dispositive of SDC's damages for both a 
contract claim and a tort claim. 
Finally, on appeal, the Sunridge entities were only seeking to recover SEL's 
damages for the lost 14 units. Thus, even if the economic loss rule did not bar SDC's 
negligence claim and SDC's damages were properly part of the appeal, SDC could never 
recover SEL's damages through its own negligence claim. Additionally, SDC never 
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raised the independent duty exception or the special relationship exceptions to the 
ecoi ioi 1:1.1c: loss 1 i lie be fore the ti ial coi 11 t (R at 38 1 -89)'L 
Based on these procedural defects, the -. .„ , . *;,j;^ib> \m*\>ci\y di;>po:^ A uf 
SDC' s remaining issi le on appeal Specifically, the Court of Appeals correctly noted that 
any arguments related to SDC's damages were not properly raised. See Sunridge 
I •i.Aopnic^; ^ -j>t - , . . \h 
presented to the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals pr^pj>Hv addressed each issue 
and correctly affirmed the trial court's rulings on KB^u ' s motions for summary 
JUiigiliCill 
S U M M A R Y O F ARGUMENTS 
As the Sunridge entities correctly point out in their brief, the only issue before 
The Sunndge entities' brief concedes that the Sunridiu' entit\ lhat incurred the damage:. 
for UK lost 14 units was SEL. Thus, tin. LVSU^ L> V\|IL,»,ICI nu uusi ol Appeal;- piopcilv 
A
* '-
 :
 I  •II.IIIIIIS .Hl i i I S S U C S 1"" . - :f ; . n r i c K - ' i 1 \ i - \ 
recover damages for the lost 14 units. 
Before the trial court, the Sunridge entities argued these two exceptions to the 
-lie loss rule as they related to only SEL's negligence claim. On appeal, however 
>unridge entities abandoned these arguments as thev H n ^ d to SFT and ?Hvn«^  ^ 
1 onlv with respect to SDC 
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Absent an assignment of claims from SEL to SDC, the only Sunridge entity that 
could recover the damages sought on appeal is SEL because it was the entity that 
allegedly incurred these damages. In this case, however, SDC assigned its claims to SEL, 
rather than from SEL to SDC. This assignment does not allow SEL to recover SEL's 
own damages through SDC's breach of contract claim. 
Moreover, based on the trial court's ruling on the second summary judgment 
motion and the parties' stipulation to not appeal the order granting summary judgment or 
any issues relating to SDC's damages, SDC cannot argue that its damages included the 
lost 14 units or that genuine issues of fact existed with respect to its damages. This Court 
should affirm the Court of Appeals because neither Sunridge entity has presented a legal 
basis on which to recover SEL's damages for the lost 14 units. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The only relief for breach of the SDC/RB&G contract, whether asserted by 
SDC or SEL, is SDC's damages, not SEL's. 
Whether the breach of contract claim is asserted by SEL, by virtue of an 
assignment, or by SDC, as a direct claim, the measure of damages that can be recovered 
is limited to those damages that SDC could recover. In this case, both SDC and SEL 
asserted a breach of contract claim. The Sunridge entities argued that SDC purportedly 
assigned all of its rights and interests in its contract with RB&G to SEL. As set forth 
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below, Utah law precludes either Sunridge entity from recovering SEL's damages 
through a bi eacl i • sf the SDC rR B&G coi lti act 
a. SEL cannot recover its own damages through an assigned claim. 
As an assignee, SEL stands in SDC's shoes and not in a better position. Utah law 
provides that the assignee is limited to recovery of only the assignor's damages when 
have asserted, but nothing more than that. See Aird l>\ > Agency v\ Zions FirstNat'l 
Bank, 612 I '.2d 3 :1 1 3 1 1 (1 J t; ill 198C ); I 'J i ? si i I'm,. s nancia., in^., ~uoo I . \ ;v IJ.1, 
i l l , 139 P.3d 1059. An assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor and never stands m a 
better position than the assignor. See SME Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, Ventuleet, 
Stainbn ickara i"" < Issociates, "I'm * , 2001 I J 1 5 1 ! fl35 28 I ' 3d 669 I n t h i s cn>x •<- \ 
to assert SDC's breach of contract claim, but it seeks to recover its own more substantial 
damages. Utah law precludes SEL from augmenting SDC's claim. 
In his dissent, Judge Bench correctly noted, that the "assignee's damages are 
limited to those damages the assignor would have suffered ' ' Se 'e " Sw n idge 
Development Corp. v. RB&G, 2007 UT App 29 at \\5. This is consistent with the 
majority's opinion. See id. at f 8. Tin is,, both the majority and Judge Bench agree that the 
^[8, 15. Moreover, both the majority and Judge Bench correctly cite to Utah law for this 
proposition. See Aird Ins., 612 P.2d at 344; West, 2006 UT App 222 at n. 1. Judge Bench 
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then departs from the majority in two respects: (1) he states that SEL should not have to 
rely on SDC to litigate its claims, and (2) he states that the record included evidence of 
damages. The Sunridge entities try to pick up on Judge Bench's analysis in Points I 
through IV of the brief, arguing that the trial court and Court of Appeals erred in 
concluding that Enterprises could not recover its own damages. 
First, the issue of whether or not a genuine issue of fact would preclude summary 
judgment is not before this Court. Judge Bench cited to the Affidavit of Stephen Stewart 
to argue that an issue of fact existed as to damages. Judge Bench relied on Holbrook Co. 
v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975) to hold that "one sworn statement" is enough to 
create an issue of fact. In this case, however, this affidavit was presented in opposition to 
RB&G's first summary judgment motion. The breach of contract claim, whether asserted 
by SDC directly or by SEL through an assignment, survived the first summary judgment 
motion. After the close of discovery, however, RB&G challenged the sufficiency of the 
SDC's damages and the affidavit through its second summary judgment motion. The 
trial court correctly determined that the affidavit's generalized statement of damages was 
insufficient without the underlying documentation or other evidence to prove the general 
and conclusory statements in the affidavit. The parties then stipulated that the trial 
court's ruling on this issue would not be appealed. Accordingly, SDC cannot claim that 
issues of fact with respect to damages precluded summary judgment. 
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This said, Judge Bench and the Sunridge entities, however, unduly complicate the 
analysis. Once tl le Coi 11 1: of Appeals coi rectly ackno\ \ ledged tl lat an assignee is lii i lite d 
to an assignor's recovery, no further analysis is needed as to who should litigate the claim 
and whether the record contained evidence of SDC or SEI 's damages. See id.; see also 
recover on assigned claims where assignor had noi incurred nnv damages to assh n >: 
Kurentv. F armers Ins, of C olumbus, ;/n .. 581 N.E.2u :>55. :> - n >ln- . Ai .• ^utliuugli 
action where the assignor had no right to recovery); Arnold M. Diamond, Inc r < iidi 
( oast 1 railing t • , . i assignee could not recovti u.. own 
additional damages and was limited to only assignor's damages). Whether SEL was 
given an opportunity to litigate its own damages claim through SDC's assignment and 
Utah law precluded SEL from recovering its own damages. 
More* -(1 *<if"Kt ^-innm i ,n ^ v 
assignor. See Nova Information Systems «/,. \ (freenwichIns. Co., SAC. 36** 1 -.3d 996. 
.-..;. Jiv,jgii ajsigiioi .itci..red a loss because it ,:aiu its assignee" 's 
claim, the assignee could not recover on assigned claim where assignee had ctiieady been 
reimbursed .for its loss and had. no damages to assign) State v. Lester, 608 P.2d 588, 589-
'Nl (( in \|i|ii M>M(I| (n ui llioiirii M.ili h,ul inaik" |MVHU nl.1. I< nmlhu Male i nuM mil 
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recover on assignment from mother where divorce decree did not require father to make 
payments to mother). Thus, SEL could never recover its own damages through an 
assignment of SDC's breach of contract claim. 
The Sunridge entities concede that the only damages that are part of this appeal are 
SEL's damages for the lost 14 units. See Sunridge Brief at p. 8. Because SDC did not 
incur theses damages and SEL is limited to only what SDC could recover, Utah law 
precludes SEL from recovering its own damages through an assigned breach of contract 
claim. This Court should affirm the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the trial court 
properly granted summary judgment on SEL's attempt to recover its own damages 
through an assigned breach of contract claim. 
b. SDC is limited to its own damages. 
SDC cannot recover the damages incurred by a separate and distinct legal entity. 
In Point VI, SDC argues that if SEL cannot recover through the assignment of SDC's 
breach of contract claim then SDC remains in privity of contract and it can recover 
"consequential damages flowing from RB&G's breaches." The Sunridge entities further 
argue that whether SDC was in privity is "factual issue." 
Although SDC purportedly assigned its breach of contract claim to SEL, SDC 
asserted its own breach of contract claim to the trial court. In fact, SDC's breach of 
contract claim was the only one of the four claims asserted in the Sunridge entities' 
complaint that survived the trial court's ruling on RB&G's first summary judgment 
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motion, (R, at 538) Whether or not SDC is in privity of contract is not a factual issue, 
rathei it is a legal c < n u :lusi( n i I ;"i n thei i no i e, R B & G v • • :»i Ud c c i icede that SDC " v as ii i 
privity of contract with RB&G. No dispute exists as to who was a party to the contract, 
rather the dispute is whether RB&G breached the contract, and if a breach occurred, what 
were SDC's damages froi i i the breach 
The measure of -i - damages was the subje ct of the second summary judgment 
motion. In this motion, RB&G. fY" purposes of the motion, assumed it had breached the 
contract and argued that SDC had iailed to prove its damages. The trial court agreed and 
contract claim failed for lack of proof of damages. Thereafter, the parties resolved this 
issue and entered into a stipulation whereby SDC agreed not to appeal the second 
111111111.11" y 111i 1 v I  11nil 1111 >I i o i1 111111 \v 11<"111ni i 11 ill: S D C c oi mld p i • : \ • e its damages 
Even if SDC had not stipulated llul its ability to prove its damages wot ildnotbe 
an issue on appeal, SDC has not provided this Court with any authority that it can recover 
SEL's damages through SDC's breach of contract claim. Furthermore, RB&G i:- no! 
jvuJit ol air\ Utah law that would allot i l\ oi sepaiali and dislnul uililics to pool llluii 
damages in order to assert a larger claim in a breach of contract action. 
Finally; because SDC asserted its own breach of contract claim after it assigned its 
breach of contract claim to SEI , SDC's own act would affirmatively impair SEL's ability 
to assert and recover through the assigned claim Onl] one Sunridge entity can assert 
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SDC's breach of contract claim. As party to the contract with RB&G, SDC could assert 
its own direct breach of contract claim; or, SDC could assign its breach of contract claim 
to SEL. In either case, the amount of recovery is limited to those damages that SDC 
could recover. Furthermore, Utah law provides that the acts of the assignor after an 
assignment are binding on the assignee. See Wiscombe v. Lockhart Co., 608 P.2d 236, 
238 (Utah 1980). As set forth in Wiscombe, when an assignor assigns a portion of its 
rights under a contract but remains a party to the assigned contract, the assignee's rights 
are subject to the actions of the assignor. See id. (holding assignee could not cure the 
assignor's default on a real estate purchase contract). Accordingly, one, but not both, of 
the Sunridge entities could assert SDC's breach of contract claim. Regardless of which 
one asserted the claim, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's rulings. 
II. The Sunridge entities have not articulated a basis or provided any authority 
to support how SDC could recover SEL's damages through a tort claim. 
a. Waiver 
While this case was pending before the trial court, SDC never articulated a basis 
for which RB&G owed an independent duty, nor did it state how a special relationship 
was created. (R. at 362-90, wherein the only argument asserted was that RB&G owed 
SEL an independent duty) With respect to all arguments relating to whether RB&G 
owed SDC an independent duty or whether a special relationship was created, the 
Sunridge entities did not make these arguments to the trial court and raised them for the 
first time on appeal. Because the trial court had no opportunity to rule on these issues, 
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the Sunridge entities should not be able raise them for the first time on appeal before the 
G >i.ii: I < >f \i »i >e* t l s i u ! , -1 1 li \d n u I S < "< ' Ct )kmi u i i Sk " i < >ns 2000 ( ) 1 98,, |9 , , 1 ; I 3< 1 
1122. 
b. SDC 
since it now lacks privity of contract then it, rather than SEL, has a viable tort claim 
against RB&G. In Point VII of the brief, SDC sets forth arguments for why it should be 
legal bases for recovery, SDC fails to set forth any legal basis b\ which it ct ukl recover 
SEL's damages through its ow n toi t claim. Furtherm. . -. 
assigned all of its claims to SEI • in tl le pi lrpoi ted ass; * ' iridge Brief at p 6 
damages. As the brief clearly articulates, the only damages that are part of the appeal are 
ShL"> damages KM the io.si. fourteen units. Since these damages are solely SEI/s, SDC 
i anno! i iY in en l lnMI ildnmi'i . IIIH HI II scpaiiid' li <>iil r n l i h . 
I 'i u thei moi e, SDC 's damages in tc i I: ai e the same as its breach of contract claim 
SDC's damages failed for lack of proof, and the trial court granted RB&G's second 
summary judgment motion. Thereafter, the parties stipulated that SDC's damages would 
mil In iippeiiilu! i on iiskiitl lMftli |||n i ipuLil inn Him "iiiiiin i i l | i niti'liu1 IUK I i h «n ly 
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states the only damages that are being sought are SEL's damages. Thus, SDC cannot 
claim the trial court erred or it was not given an opportunity to prove its damages due to 
RB&G's alleged breach. 
c. SEL 
Although SEL asserted a tort claim before the trial court, SEL abandoned this 
claim before the Court of Appeals and now on Certiorari to this Court. Because SEL has 
not presented any argument to recover its own damages through a tort claim, RB&G 
declines to brief this claim. 
d. Economic Loss Rule 
/. Independent Duty Exception 
Despite the fact that SDC cannot recover SEL's damages through a tort claim and 
the fact that SEL has abandoned its tort claim, RB&G will discuss the application of the 
economic loss rule to this case. 
The Sunridge entities' primary argument as to why the economic loss rule does 
not bar a tort claim is based on the independent duty exception. Under this exception, the 
economic loss rule will not bar a claim for negligence that seeks to recover solely 
economic losses when a party owes an independent duty of care that arises separate from 
that parties' contractual duty of care. See Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, ^ [17, 48 
P.3d 235. SDC argues that RB&G owed it an independent duty, arising from a general 
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common law duty. While it is true that Utah recognizes a narrow exception to economic 
loss rule whei i a pai ty owes at i indepei idei it di ity, tl le independent di lty exception is not 
applicable in this case where RB&Gfs duties arise solely from its contract with SDC. In 
other words, SDC reads the "independent" requirement out of the independent duty 
exception As set forth below, , the 01 it; ' di it} t:>eO * ' eei i SDC and R B&G arose froi n the 
parties' contract. 
In Hermansen v. Tasulis, this Court modified Utah's economic loss rule in order to 
create a narrow exception to the general bar on recovery of solely economic damages 
when a ciiity exists that is independent of and separate from the contractual duties. See 
Hermansen, 2002 UT 52, f 17, 48 P.3d 235. In creating this exception, however, the 
Court did not abandon the original concept behind the economic loss rule, and stated: 
"[t]he proper foci is ii i ai I analysis I indei 1:1 le ecoi 101 nic loss it i i! = is on tl le soi n ce of the 
duties alleged to have been breached." Hermansen, 2002 UT 52 at ^ 15-16 {quoting 
Grynbergv. Agric. Tech, Inc., If) \\M\ 1267, 1269 (Colo. 2000) (emphasis added)). The 
Utah Supreme Court has modeled Utah's economic loss rule on the Colorado i: i lie See 
Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, ffl5-16 {quoting Grynberg, 10 P.3d at 1269). The 
Colorado Supi ei i le Coi n t explained tl le Colorado rule in a later case: 
Our economic loss rule requires the court to focus on the contractual 
relationship between the parties, rather than their professional status, in 
determining the existence of an independent duty of care. The interrelated 
contracts contained [defendant's] duty of care. [Plaintiffs] tort claims are 
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based on duties that are imposed by contract and therefore, contract law 
provides the remedies. 
BRW, Inc. v. Dufficy & Sons, Inc., 99 P.3d 66, 67-68 (Colo. 2004) (addressing multiple 
inter-related contracts between commercially sophisticated parties on a large construction 
project). 
In order to determine if the independent duty exception applies, a two-step analysis is 
used: (1) are the losses purely economic, and (2) what is the source of the duty being 
imposed. See Gulf stream Aerospace Services Corp. v. United States Aviation 
Underwriters, Inc., 635 S.E.2d 38, 44 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (applying Utahfs economic 
loss rule and finding source of duty was contractual rather than independent). If the 
losses are purely economic and the source of the duty is contractual, "it is improper to 
further analyze the existence of an independent tort duty in determining whether an 
economic loss may be recovered." See id. In short, the first step is to look at the contract 
to determine if it provides the source of the duties being alleged. If a contract is the 
source of the duties alleged, the court does not need to determine if a parallel or 
overlapping duty exists. 
In this case, neither party disputes that the Sunridge entities' damages are purely 
economic. Thus, the analysis turns on the source of the duty being imposed. The 
Sunridge entities argue that professional engineers owe a duty to the public at large to 
perform competently, professionally, and thoroughly. Thus, the Sunridge entities argue 
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that it was foreseeable that if RB&G breached its professional duty than either entity 
could recover purely econ- ;: uiees. 
RB&G owed no independent duty to either Sunridge entity or the public at large to 
produce geologic reports on the subject property involved in tl lis ease R B&G entered 
into a contract with SDC to perform this analysis. If the reports were deficient, any 
damages are traceable solely to the reports ai id R B&G's contractual obligations. Stated 
differently, neither Sunridge entity can seek economic damages that arise independently 
of the contract or the reports. Assuming engineers owe the general public a general duty 
of care, t - ; - d e p e n d e n t cii it:;; of care was not breached - * proximate cause 
of the damages which either Sunridge entity attempted to recover. Any damages in this 
case flow directly and solely from the contract between RB&G and SDC. As such, no 
independent duty exists that w 01 ild allow nllier Siiiiinipe enfih to \v<'0\ ei damages from 
RB&G. To the extent that RB&G breached a duty, it was a contractual duty. As such, 
the independent duty exception is not applicable to SDC's claim. 
ii. Special Relationship 
In arguing that RB&G had a "special relationship" with its client, the Sunridge 
entities are attempting to completely eviscerate long standing principles of tort and 
contract law ai id, \ iltii i lately, to effectively gut the economic loss doctrine. The Sunridge 
entities1 brief argues that RB&G's special relationship derives from the following: 
"information asymmetry, engineers1 esoteric knowledge and expertise, and their clients1 
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reliance thereon." In sum, because engineers have specialized knowledge, whether it be 
esoteric or not, and because a client relies on this specialized knowledge, the Sunridge 
entities argue a special relationship is created between engineers and those that contract 
with them. The Sunridge entities' argument is that anytime a professional possesses 
specialized knowledge upon which someone relies then a special relationship is created. 
Thus, all professionals, according to the Sunridge entites, have a special relationship with 
not only their clients, but anyone else who might ever rely on the professional's expertise 
in making economic decisions. 
As discussed above, the Sunridge entities attempt to do an end run around basic 
principles of contract law in order to create a cause of action in tort. In so doing, the 
Sunridge entities strain to create an independent duty running from professionals to 
clients and also now to form a special relationship. The only reason RB&G provided its 
professional expertise and opinions as to the geology of the land underlying the Sunridge 
project was because it entered into a contract to do so. Absent this contract, RB&G 
would not have offered any opinions or services on this project. The contract provided 
for the scope of RB&G's services and the compensation that RB&G would receive. 
In support of its special relationship argument, the Sunridge entities cite to 
numerous cases in Utah which they claim support their position. Each case, however, is 
inapposite. Specifically, in three of the cases, the court did not address the issue of 
whether a special relationship existed. See West v. Inter-Financial Inc., 2006 UT App 
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222, 139 P.3d 1059; Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc., 713 
P.2d 55 (Utah 1986); Milliner v Elmer Fox and Co,, 529 P.2d 806 (Utah \<) /4» In two 
of the other cases cited by the Sunridge entities, Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corporation, 
2006 I IT 47, 143 P.3d 283, and Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, 48 P.3d 235, the 
Supreme I 'out I in lin; i end, J < nieletitiiiniij11 nhctlin a Ic %i! <lut\ existed, discussed that 
the existence of a special relationship may give rise to a legal duty; however, the Court's 
holdings merely determined that a legal duty existed given the facts and circumstances of 
the case. See Yazd, 2006 UT 47 at f^fil 1-26 (developei bi lildei n lay owe bi Iyer of hon le a 
legal duty); Hermansen, 2002 UT 52 at ff 18-23 (seller's real estate agent owes duty to 
buyer of home). 
The other case relied on by the Sunridge entities to support its special 
relationship argumei iii is ffW>/> v University of Utah. As stated in Weh » "when used in 
the context of ordinary negligence, a special relationship is what is required to give rise to 
ity to a c t . . . . " Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80, %\2, 125 P.3d 906. In 
contrast to Webb where the parties had en eontiacliinl rda(iofv4ii[), the source of the duty 
in this case is clearly set forth in the contract. Absent the contract, RB&G owed no duty 
to act to either Si)(" oi SMI < luce the source of the duty is found to be a contract, the 
inquiry as to whether an independent duty or special relationship exists ends. See 
Hermansen, 2002 UT 52 at f 15-16; Gulfstream, 635 S.E.2d at 44. 
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In other words, what gives rise to RB&G's duty to act is not a "special 
relationship." Rather, it is a bargained for contract which defines the scope of services 
that RB&G is obligated to provide. RB&G had no obligation to provide more than what 
the scope of the contract required, and the contract did not transform the relationship 
between RB&G and Development into a "special relationship." To the extent, RB&G 
failed to fulfill its contractual obligation, the sole remedy is a claim for breach of 
contract. See BRW, Inc., 99 P.3d at 67-68. SDC had a breach of contract claim, and it 
asserted it in this case. 
This is not a case where the law has not provided SDC an appropriate remedy. 
In contrast to those cases where a homeowner would be without a remedy absent an 
exception to the economic loss rule, see, e.g., Yazd and Moore, SDC had a remedy. Its 
remedy was a breach of contract claim. The economic loss doctrine preserves the 
sanctity of the contract claim and requires that parties enforce these rights and obligations 
through contract actions rather than tort actions. 
In addition, RB&G had no reason to know that SEL or other third parties would 
rely on its work. At the time that Development and RB&G entered into the contract, 
SDC was the owner and developer of the project and SEL had not been formed. RB&G 
could not reasonably foresee that SDC would sell the land to SEL and enter into a 
purported assignment with a sister entity when that entity was not in existence at the time 
the contract was entered into and at the time RB&G performed its obligations under the 
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contract. As such, the Sunridge entities1 reliance on Milliner v. Elmer Fox and Co., 
whic in accountant I mble when the accountant knew that a report would be relied 
upon by third parties, is distinguishable because RB&G had i 10 ability to know a yet to be 
formed entity would rely on its report on this project. See Milliner v. Elmer Fox and Co., 
529 P hi KOli, KdK |! Hah I"!111 ' 11 SDC's ivmcdy for any alleged breach of duty was a 
breach of contract claim. To the extent it could not recover SEL's damages, this was a 
product of the Sunridge entities own doing in an attempt to limit their own exposure to a 
liability claim. 
Any predicament in which the Sunridge entities now find themselves is a 
product of their own decision to limit their own liability exposure. 
The situation that the Sunridge entities now find themselves in is a product of their 
own making, and they must accept the reciprocal obligations and limitations of their 
corporate structure. The Sunridge entities may not evade the consequences of their 
corporate form. SDC created SEL to benefit from its separate corporate identity, namely 
to avoid liabilities I laving created a separate corporate structure, SEL must also accept 
the burdens of its separate existence. 
Utah law recognizes the impor tance of the sepai ate legal identities of corporations 
and has been unwilling to permit parties to ignore the distinctions. See Sachs v. Lesser, 
2007 IJT . •. - * 163 P.3d 662, cert, granted 168 P.3d 1264. As this Court noted: 
"[corporate entities] should not be permitted to aiio\ tin- benefits o( |,i ., onipji ", f 
separate corporate structure for some purposes while also claiming it elevates form over 
substance11 when it is inconvenient for another purpose. Sachs, 2007 I JT App 169 at f51 
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{citing Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Steele Ranch, 533 P.2d 888, 891 (Utah 1975)). The 
general rule is that "where persons organized a corporation to acquire the advantages 
flowing from its existence as a separate entity, they should not be able to disregard the 
corporate entity to gain an advantage for another purpose." Steele Ranch, 588 P.2d at 
891. 
The Sunridge entities chose to form SEL to benefit from its separate corporate 
existence. The Sunridge entities cannot reap the benefits of SEL's incorporation while 
evading the consequences to suit their convenience. In this case, the very device that the 
Sunridge entities used to shield themselves from liability is their undoing on their own 
claim. Certainly, the Sunridge entities would not excuse the corporate formalities if the 
shoe was on the other foot and RB&G was attempting to sue SEL for breach of contract. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing facts and authorities, this Court should affirm the Court of 
Appeals ruling in this case. SDC and SEL have failed to articulate any legal bases to 
allow either party to recover SEL's damages for the lost 14 units. 
DATED this day of July, 2008. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
:OBURN 
LRY E. PETERSON 
iorneys for Appellee, RB&G 
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CRAIG C COBURN [0688] 
LINCOLN HARRIS [8196] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for RB&G Engineering, Inc. 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801)531-2000 
Facsimile: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUNRIDGE DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KHA'Ti FNGINEERING, INC , 
Defendant. 
FINAL ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
CT?o\CDI3H 
Case No, 030400328 
1>" isiun Nil 5 
Plaintiffs Sunridge Development Corp. and Sunridge Enterprises, LLC, and defendant 
RB&G Engineering Inc. having, by and through their respective counsel of i ecoi d, stipi ilated t : • 
and moved the Court for a final, appealable order. 
Based on the Stipulated Motion to Dismiss, IT IS Hi Kf«HY i )R!)IiKH> as fiill.m 
1 The September 1, 2005 order on partial summary judgment is final and appealable; 
C:\Documents and Scttings\CCC\Local Sctting?\Tcmp\finaJ.orda-.judgmcnt.diamisa.reviscd_l.wpd 
3. 
The October 10, 2006 order on partial summary judgment, dismissing all Plaintiffs 
remaining claims, except for Plaintiffs claim for the "RB&G Reports/Tests (post -
1995)" is final, and Plaintiffs shall not appeal this order; 
Plaintiffs remaining claim regarding "RB&G Reports/Tests (post -1995)" has 
been fully compromised and settled and shall be dismissed on its merits with 
prejudice, each party to bear their respective attorneys fees and costs. 
Further, as this order disposes of all remaining claims by and between all parties to this 
action and there being no reason for delay, this final order and judgment of dismissal is to be 
forthwith entered. 
DATED t h i s ' S ^ l day of NovSmBer, 200^7 
By the Court: 
^^ i^  
avid N, Mortensen 
)istrict Court 
bounty, State of Utah 
Stbphra Quesenbeny 
HILLIJOHNSON & SCHMUTZ 
Attorneys for Sunridge Development Corp. 
and Sunridge Enterprises, LLC 
C:\Documcnts and Scttings\CCC\Local Sctting3\Tctnp\final.ordcr.judgmertldismi8a.reviscd_).wpd 
CRAIG C. COBURN [0688] 
LINCOLN HARRIS [8196] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for RB&G Engineering, Inc. 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Facsimile. (801) 532-5506 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUNRIDGE DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION, etal.., 
Plaintiffs;; 
vs. 
RB&G ENGINEERING, INC., 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 030400328 
Division No. 5 
Defendant RB&G Engineering, Inc.'s ("RB&G") Motions for Summary Judgment 
and Partial Summary Judgment came on for hearing before the Cot • «" .. \ i T, Friday, 
July 29, 2005, Hon. Fred D. Howard, presiding, with plaintiffs Sunridge Development 
Corporation ("SDC") and Sunridge Enterprises, LLC ("SEL") represented by their counsel of 
record, J. Bryan Quesenberry, and RB&G represented by its counsel of record, Craig C. Coburn. 
G:\EDSI\DOCS\l 1260\0150\G40182. WPD 
RLED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
RECEIVED 
SEP 06° 
Richards, Brandt 
Miller & Nelson 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Having reviewed the record, read the parties' briefs, and heard the arguments of 
counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court hereby finds and/or concludes as follows: 
1. There are no genuine issues of material fact. 
2. The only issues presented are issues of law. 
3. All contracts at issue were between SDC and RB&G and were performed 
in 1993-95. Neither SEL nor SGS had or have a contract directly with RB&G. 
4. SDC and SEL each assert breach of contract and negligence claims against 
RB&G. 
5. SEL was formed in 1996. That same year, SDC purportedly assigned its 
rights under its contracts to SEL or SEL assigned whatever rights it had to SDC.1 
6. SDC and SEL allege to have suffered damages from RB&G's breach of 
these contracts and/or from RB&G's negligent acts, errors or omissions in the performance of 
said contracts. SDC and SEL further allege that a third entity not party to this action, SGS 
Associates Inc. ("SGS"), incurred damages as a result of RB&G's alleged breaches. 
7. SGS is not a party to this action and its apparent claims are not before the 
Court.2 
SDC/SEL principal and witness, Steve Stewart, testified at deposition that SEL assigned its rights to 
SDC and, in a subsequent affidavit offered in opposition to this motion, that SDC assigned its rights to SEL. 
Whether or not SDC assigned its rights to SEL or vice versa is irrelevant, as the only legally viable claim against 
RB&G is SDC's breach of contract claim. 
Were SGS and its claims before the Court, they would be subject to the same analysis and treatment as 
SEL's direct breach of contract and negligence claims 
G:\EDSI\DOCS\ 11260\0150\G40182 WPD -2-
8 SDC and SEL have identified, characterized and estimated their respective 
damages, as well as those of SGS, as follows 
1 § 
1
 i 
II 2 
3 
4 
II S 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
1 13 1 
[ J)anjage Category ] 
Lost Units/Lots 
Payroll (11 months) 
Equipment (11 months) 
Trenching/Backfilling Studies 2-4 
Office & Overhead (11 months) 
Utilities (11 months) 
| RB&G Reports/Tests (post-1995) | 
Interest (11 mos ) 
Kirton McConkie (Attys Fees) 
John Olsen (Attys Fees) 
IGES (16 Acre Study (redo)) | 
F J Clark Associates (new plats) 
Landscaping (fault zone) | 
I SDC$) 
204,062 
3,150 
3,167 
767 
1,611 
11,295 
675 
...SEM$) 
1,057,9833 
204,062 
3,167 
767 
35,589 
102,000 
3,280 
285 
18,00p_ 
SOS($> j 
204,062 j 
25,500 j 
3,167 J 
767 j 
9 The damages claimed by SDC, SEL and/or SGS are purely economic 
damages - that is, no claim is made for death, bodily injury, or physical property damage 
10 As the purported assignee of SDC's rights under the RB&G contracts, 
SEL stepped into the SDC's shoes and obtained SDC's rights under those contracts SME 
Industries, Inc v Thompson, Ventulett Stainback and Associates, Inc , 2001 UT 54, 28 P 3d 
669 
3
 The Court notes that while SEL's number for Lost Units/Lots vanes in the record, the Court's treatment 
herein of this damage claim or category applies to the claim or category itself, regardless of the number 
G \EDSI\DOCS\l 1260\0150\G40182 WPD - 3 -
11. Because RB&G had completed its performance of its contracts prior to any 
assignment of SDC's contract rights, it had also breached said contracts, if at all, prior to said 
assignment. Thus, at the time of the purported assignment to SEL, all SDC had by way of 
remaining rights under the RB&G contracts was the right to enforce those contracts in the event 
of an RB&G breach and to pursue, if anything, SDC's remedies resulting from any such breach. 
12. Because the right of enforcement was all that was left SDC at the time of 
any assignment, this right was all that SDC could have assigned to SEL - that is, the right to 
enforce SDC's rights under the RB&G contract(s) and to pursue, if anything, SDC's damages for 
any such breach. Id If SDC assigned it rights to SEL, this assignment did not establish privity 
between SEL and RB&G or otherwise entitle SEL to pursue SEL's remedies against RB&G for 
the damages which SEL allegedly incurred as a result of any RB&G breach. Id 
13. Utah's economic loss rule bars recovery of purely economic losses under a 
negligence or other unintentional tort theory, irrespective of any privity of contract between the 
plaintiff and defendant. Id 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions: 
1. SDC and SEL's negligence claims against RB&G are dismissed in their 
entirety, on their merits, and with prejudice. 
2. SEL's breach of contract claim against RB&G - including any and all 
damage claims for Lost Units/Lots, the RB&G Reports/Tests, Interest, and Landscaping, and 
SEL's share of Payroll, Office & Overhead, and Utilities - is dismissed in its entirety, on its 
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merits, and with prejudice. 
3. SGS's apparent claims against RB&G - including all damage claims for 
Equipment and SGS's share of Payroll, Office & Overhead, and Utilities - are dismissed in their 
entirety, on their merits, and with prejudice, regardless of theory. 
4. The damages recoverable, if any, under SDC's breach of contract claim -
the only claim or cause of action remaining, whether or not assigned to SEL - are limited to the 
costs of Trenching/Backfilling Studies 2-4 and the IGES 16-Acre Study, the FJ Clark fees, and 
SDC's share of the Kirton McConkie attorneys fees, Payroll, Office & Overhead, and Utilities. 
DATED this __[^_ day ofAif|iL, 2005. 
By the Court: 
/S/ FRED D. HOWARD 
Hon. Fred D. Howard 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Approved as to Form: 
Steven Qiiesenberrry 
J. Bryan Quesenberry 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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